left arrow Nov 20, 2026

GAAR, Too Far?

Introduction:

GAAR, or the General Anti-Avoidance Rule, is one powerhouse of a topic for all tax nerds today.  It is broad in its reach, vague at its edges and formidable in its potential consequences.  For tax nerds, it is a fascinating conundrum; for the Income Tax Department, it is less a scalpel and more a sledgehammer; and for the taxpayers, it is a looming source of uncertainty over their tax planning arrangements.  Against this  background, 3 judgments of the Telangana High Court (“HC”) offer some insights into how Courts may interpret and apply the relevant provisions, questions that may arise from the scope and breadth of such provisions and the principles that may guide resolution as jurisprudence evolves going forward.  Curiously, all three said judgments involve “Bonus Stripping”.

In the present article, the authors shall delve into the concept of Bonus Stripping, including its interaction with Special Anti-Avoidance Rule (“SAAR”) envisioned under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) and GAAR (which is codified in Chapter X-A of the Act).  Thereafter, they shall analyse the 3 judgments of the Telangana HC on the issue.  Finally, they shall set out some broad propositions of general application.

Bonus Stripping:  Conceptual Note:

Bonus Stripping is a tax planning strategy, whereby an investor acquires securities or mutual fund units shortly before a bonus issue and after they begin trading ex-bonus, sells the original securities or units at a loss, while retaining the bonus securities or units allotted without any payment.  The strategy is designed to generate a short-term capital loss, which may be set off against other taxable capital gains, while retaining the bonus securities or units for future appreciation.  In substance, the strategy seeks to monetise the notional reduction in the value of the original holding following the bonus issue by crystallising a capital loss for tax purposes, without relinquishing the entire investment.

To illustrate, suppose shares of Company A trade at INR 1,000 cum-bonus (i.e., before the record date).  B purchases one share for INR 1,000, within 3 months prior to the record date.  Company A subsequently issues bonus shares in the ratio of 1:1, pursuant to which B holds 3 shares, each worth approximately INR 500.  B then sells one of the shares for INR 505, within 9 months after the record date, and books a short-term capital loss of INR 495, which can be set off against other capital gains.  In this case, under the provisions applicable for AYs prior to AY 2023-24, such a loss, arising from Bonus Stripping of shares, was not specifically restricted under Section 94(8) of the Act.  Further, the bonus share retained by B would have a NIL cost of acquisition under Section 55(2)(aa)(iiia) of the Act.  Consequently, while B could claim the loss of INR 495 in the year of sale, the subsequent sale of the bonus share would result in a capital gain equal to its entire sale consideration. The arrangement, therefore, ordinarily resulted in a deferral of tax[1], rather than a permanent tax saving.

The Finance (No. 2.) Act, 2004 inserted Section 94(8) into the Act to counter Bonus Stripping.  As originally enacted, the provision applied only to “units” (principally mutual fund units), and not to shares or other securities.  Further, it applied where a person (a) acquired units within 3 months prior to the record date; (b) was allotted additional units without payment on the basis of the original holding; and (c) sold all or any of the original units within 9 months after the record date, while continuing to hold all or any of the bonus units.  In all such cases, the loss incurred on the sale of the original units was ignored for tax purposes and correspondingly treated as the cost of acquisition of the bonus units retained by the investor.  Thereafter, the Finance Act, 2022[2] extended the scope of Section 94(8) to “securities” and expanded the definition of “units” to include units of business trusts (including REITs and InvITs) and beneficial interests in Alternative Investment Funds.  These amendments took effect from 01 April, 2023 and apply from Assessment Year (“AY”) 2023-24 onwards.  Accordingly, until the amendment became applicable, Bonus Stripping in shares and other securities fell outside the specific anti-avoidance restriction contained in Section 94(8) of the Act[3].

Having set out the above context, it is apposite to analyse the relevant judgments of the Telangana HC, albeit briefly.

Judgments of the Telangana HC:

Ayodhya Rami Reddy Alla vs. PCIT[4]:

Facts:

This is one of the earliest significant judicial pronouncements on the application of GAAR in India.  In the said case, the taxpayer acquired approximately 5.56 crore shares of Ramky Estate and Farms Ltd., a closely held group company, through a private placement shortly before the company declared a bonus issue in March 2019.  The bonus issue, made in the ratio of 5:1 (i.e., 5 bonus shares for every share held), resulted in the value of each share declining from approximately INR 115 to INR 19.20.  Within days, on 14 March, 2019, the taxpayer sold the shares to Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd., another group entity, at INR 19.20 per share, hence, reporting a short-term capital loss of approximately INR 462 crore.  The said loss was set off against long-term capital gains arising from the sale of shares of another group company, Ramky Enviro Engineers Ltd.  The Income Tax Department alleged that the purchaser did not have sufficient funds of its own to acquire the shares and that the consideration was funded by another group entity, Oxford Ayyapa Consulting Services India Pvt. Ltd., resulting in a circular movement of funds within the group itself.  To this, the taxpayer’s principal contention was that Section 94(8), which specifically addresses Bonus Stripping, did not extend to ordinary shares at the relevant time.  Hence, the Income tax Department could not circumvent the specific statutory framework by invoking GAAR under Chapter X-A of the Act.  The taxpayer also relied upon the Shome Committee’s recommendation that GAAR should ordinarily not be invoked where a SAAR already addresses the transaction in question.

Holding:

A Division Bench of the Telangana HC rejected the contentions canvassed on behalf of the taxpayer, holding that Chapter X-A of the Act, having been introduced subsequent to Chapter X of the Act and containing a non-obstante clause under Section 95(1) of the Act, overrides other provisions of the Act.  Further, it relied upon Section 100 of the Act, which contemplates the application of GAAR in addition to, or as a substitute for, other existing methods of determining tax liability.  Furthermore, it distinguished the Shome Committee’s recommendation, observing that its preference for SAAR over GAAR primarily concerned Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements and not domestic transactions of the nature under consideration by it.  In effect, on the facts, the Telangana HC found the arrangement to be devoid of commercial substance and observed that the Income Tax Department had “persuasively and convincingly” demonstrated that the transaction did not constitute a permissible tax avoidance arrangement.  It emphasised the burden placed upon the taxpayer under Section 96(2) of the Act, to rebut the statutory presumption of an impermissible avoidance arrangement.  In that view of the matter, the Writ Petitions were dismissed, permitting the Income Tax Department to proceed further in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 144BA of the Act.

The case has since travelled to the Supreme Court.  The taxpayer preferred a Special Leave Petition.  On 12 August, 2024, the Supreme Court granted leave, and the matter was registered as Civil Appeal No. 9790 of 2024.  Subsequently, by an order dated 18 October, 2024, it granted interim relief, directing that “no further proceedings shall be taken on the basis of show cause notice dated 14th December, 2022“.  To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no subsequent final judgment, disposing of the appeal.

Smt. Anvida Bandi vs. DCIT[5]:

Facts:

In this case, the taxpayer, a regular investor in shares and mutual funds, earned long-term capital gains of approximately INR 44.14 crore from the sale of shares in AY 2020–21.  She subsequently invested the sale proceeds in shares of HCL Technologies, some of which were sold post-bonus during the same year, resulting in a short-term capital loss of approximately INR 17.65 crore which was set off against the long-term capital gains.  The GAAR Approving Panel (“AP”) treated the transactions as an impermissible avoidance arrangement, relying substantially on the timing of the transactions.

Holding:

The Telangana HC, however, set aside the directions of the GAAR AP, observing that the Income Tax Department had failed to establish that the taxpayer had transacted with any known or related person; that all the transactions had been executed through the stock exchange; and that the taxpayer had been regularly trading in shares over a considerable period.  Further, it held that the timing of a purchase or sale, by itself, could not constitute sufficient grounds for invoking GAAR.

Significantly, the Telangana HC drew support from the Shome Committee’s recommendation that transactions undertaken through stock exchanges, including the timing of such transactions, ought to be kept outside the purview of GAAR.

EKGE Retail LLP vs. ACIT[6]:

Facts:

New Meena Bazar International Pvt. Ltd. (“NMB”), which operated a retail apparel business in South India under the brand name “Mebaz”, transferred its business as a going concern to Vedant Fashions Pvt. Ltd. on 13 June , 2017, for a consideration of approximately INR 210.46 crore. Subsequently, NMB was amalgamated with Madevsag Retail Pvt. Ltd. (“MRL”), with an appointed date of 01 April, 2017, pursuant to which MRL was deemed to be the transferor of the business[7].  The long-term capital gains arising from the slump sale, computed in accordance with Section 50B of the Act, after deducting the net worth of approximately INR 33.70 crore , amounted to approximately INR 175.91 crore.  After discharging the liabilities aggregating to approximately INR 59.40 crore, MRL was left with an investable surplus of approximately INR 130 crore during AY 2018-19.  This was an unprecedented level of investible funds for MRL, far exceeding the amounts it had historically managed.  Hence, MRL engaged with several wealth managers and an internal consultant to determine an appropriate investment strategy.  MRL eventually decided to allocate one-third of the surplus to listed equities and the remaining two-thirds to bonds and debt funds.  As part of its equity investment strategy, MRL was advised that acquiring shares of listed companies prior to a bonus issue and subsequently selling them upon allotment of bonus shares could generate a short-term return of approximately 1 to 3 %.  Acting on the said advice, MRL invested approximately INR 106.31 crore in pre-bonus shares of several large listed companies.  It subsequently sold shares aggregating to approximately INR 57.24 crore post-bonus, while retaining shares aggregating to approximately INR 49.07 crore . These transactions resulted in a short-term capital loss of approximately INR 49.33, crore , which MRL set off against the long-term capital gains arising from the slump sale, in terms of Section 70(2) of the Act.  Thereafter, a search conducted on 27 November, 2018, which did not yield any incriminating material.  Further, of the 105 assessments of the group reopened pursuant to the said search, 104 were ultimately completed with NIL or minimal additions.  Notwithstanding, the Assessing Officer proposed invoking GAAR.  Upon reference having been made under Section 144BA of the Act, the GAAR AP directed that the transactions be treated as an impermissible avoidance arrangement under clauses (b) and (d) of Section 96(1) of the Act.

Holding:

The Telangana HC framed the central question as whether the purchase of shares prior to a bonus issue and their subsequent sale post-bonus, through a recognised stock exchange, constituted an “arrangement” within the meaning of Section 102(1) of the Act and, if so, whether such arrangement qualified as an impermissible avoidance arrangement under clauses (b) and (d) of Section 96(1) of the Act.  The Telangana HC answered both questions in favour of the taxpayer, for the following reasons:

Strict Construction of GAAR and Burden of Proof:

At Para 29, the Telangana HC observed that Chapter X-A of the Act is a provision “of considerable rigour” and, hence, its conditions must be construed strictly.  For Section 96(1) of the Act to apply, it must first be established that the main purpose of an arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit and that the arrangement satisfies at least 1 of the 4 tainted-element tests prescribed under clauses (a) to (d).  Crucially, the existence of an “arrangement” is a threshold requirement.  The burden of establishing each of these statutory ingredients rests upon the Income Tax Department.

Absence of an “Arrangement”:

At Paras 31 and 32, the Telangana HC observed that the expressions “transaction”, “operation”, “scheme”, “agreement or understanding”, as employed in Section 102(1) of the Act, when read together, contemplate “a degree of concert, design or arrangement between identifiable parties, or at the very least a pre-ordained set of steps whose outcome is within the control of the person said to have entered into it”.  It further noted that, in the present case, the transactions were executed on a recognised stock exchange, where the identity of the counterparty was unknown and the price at which the shares were traded and consequently, the quantum of gain or loss, was determined by market forces.  Further, the Petitioner neither identified, nor controlled the counterparty or the outcome of the trades.  Viewed accordingly, the transactions could not be characterised as an “operation” or “scheme” within the meaning of Section 102(1) of the Act.

Absence of a Main Purpose to Obtain a Tax Benefit:

At Paras 33 to 35, the Telangana HC emphasised that the Legislature had deliberately employed the expression “main purpose”, rather than “a purpose” or “an incidental consequence”.  The mere fact that a taxpayer claims a set-off expressly permitted under the Act does not, by itself, establish that the underlying transaction was undertaken principally to secure a tax benefit.  Further, the Telangana HC found that the GAAR AP had substantially disregarded the commercial circumstances surrounding the investments and had effectively reasoned “backwards from effect to intention”, inferring a tax-avoidance purpose merely because the transactions resulted in a tax benefit.  Furthermore, the fact that the Petitioner retained a substantial portion of its equity investment, was inconsistent with the allegation that the transactions were undertaken solely to manufacture a loss.

Absence of Misuse or Abuse of the Provisions of the Act:

At Paras 36 to 39, the Telangana HC observed that the income-tax is a single, unified and annual levy, and that the set-off of losses under Section 70(2) of the Act forms an integral part of the statutory mechanism for computing total income.  Further, a “tax benefit” for GAAR purposes cannot be equated with every reduction in tax liability arising from the application of a provision of the Act.  Rather, it must involve a benefit secured by circumventing or subverting the statutory scheme, since “abuse connotes the employment of a provision for a purpose alien to that for which it was enacted”.  The Telangana HC observed that in the present case, the Petitioner had applied Sections 50B, 55 and 70(2) of the Act, along with the FIFO method, as per the law.  Hence, mere exercise of a statutory entitlement, without more, could not be characterised as misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act.

Absence of Abnormal or Ordinary Means:

At Paras 36 to 39, the Telangana HC observed that in examining clause (d) of Section 96(1) of the Act, which covers an arrangement entered into or carried out by means, or in a manner, not ordinarily employed for bona fide purposes, trading in securities through a SEBI-regulated exchange, with Securities Transaction Tax duly paid, constituted “the most ordinary, conventional and universally employed means” of dealing in securities.  Having observed so, since the Petitioner had undertaken the transactions through a recognised stock exchange, without resorting to any unusual or contrived mode of execution, clause (d) was inapplicable.

Absence of Material for Invocation of GAAR:

At Para 40, the Telangana HC took note of the fact that the search had yielded no incriminating material.  Further, 104 out of the 105 assessments of the group reopened pursuant to the search had resulted in NIL or minimal additions.  As per the Telangana HC, even though these circumstances did not, by themselves, preclude the invocation of GAAR, they called for a particularly careful examination and demonstration of each statutory ingredient before the Petitioner’s transactions could be characterised as an “impermissible avoidance arrangement”.  The Income Tax Department had failed to discharge this burden, and the directions of the GAAR AP did not engage with it.

Analysis:

EKGE Retail (Supra) should not be understood as laying down a blanket proposition that losses arising from Bonus Stripping in listed shares are immune from challenge under the Income-tax Act.  The decision must be read subject to certain important qualifications.

First, the judgment’s direct relevance to Bonus Stripping transactions is confined to transactions undertaken prior to AY 2023-24.  As discussed at relevant places elsewhere above, with effect from AY 2023-24, the amended Section 94(8) of the Act applies mechanically, without requiring the Income Tax Department to establish a tax-avoidance purpose or an arrangement within the meaning of Section 102(1) of the Act.  Further, it does not envision an exemption for transactions undertaken through recognised stock exchanges.  Hence, the anonymity of counterparties, market-determined prices and the commercial rationale underlying the transactions, which weighed in the Telangana HC’s analysis, would not, by themselves, afford protection against the amended provision.  On the facts in EKGE Retail (Supra), involving purchases shortly before the record date and sales within weeks of the allotment of bonus shares, the amended provision would appear to apply squarely.  The judgment is, hence, of greater significance for AYs 2018-19 to 2022-23, when the Income Tax Department’s principal statutory recourse against such transactions, in the absence of an applicable SAAR, was GAAR.

Second, even for the aforesaid AYs, the judgment is substantially constrained by its favourable factual matrix.  The transactions involved shares of large listed companies, executed through recognised stock exchanges at market-determined prices; the taxpayer had undertaken a documented advisory and investment-allocation process, retaining a substantial investment holding, without being engaged in any incriminating conduct.  The judgment may not extend to cases involving shares of closely held companies, related-party counterparties, circular movement of funds, or material demonstrating that the transactions were pre-arranged or marketed as a tax-loss-harvesting strategy.  The judgment in Ayodhya Rami Reddy Alla (Supra) illustrates how materially different facts may warrant a different conclusion.

Third, GAAR continues to operate alongside the amended SAAR.  Consequently, the expansion of Section 94(8) of the Act does not exhaust the Income Tax Department’s powers to examine Bonus Stripping arrangements under GAAR.  Transactions structured to remain outside the 3-month and 9-month windows prescribed under Section 94(8) of the Act, or involving additional related-party or pre-arranged steps, may nevertheless attract GAAR, provided the statutory conditions under Sections 96 and 102 of the Act are independently satisfied and the exclusions under Rule 10U of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, are not attracted.  Hence, amendment to Section 94(8) of the Act cannot be construed as creating a safe harbour for transactions falling outside its specific parameters.

A comparative analysis of the 3 judgments of the Telangana HC, is tabulated below:

Ayodhya Rami Reddy Alla (Supra) Smt. Anvida Bandi (Supra) EKGE Retail (Supra)
AY AY 2019-20. AY 2020-21. AY 2018-19.
Stage of Challenge Show-cause notice under Section 144BA of the Act; before reference to the GAAR AP. Directions of the GAAR AP under Section 144BA(6) of the Act. Directions of the GAAR AP under Section 144BA(6) of the Act.
Securities in Question Shares of a closely held group company, acquired by private placement. Shares of a large listed company (HCL Technologies). Shares of several large listed companies.
Mode of sale Off-market sale to an identified group company. Recognised Stock Exchange. Recognised Stock Exchange.
Funding and counterparty Purchaser allegedly lacked funds; and consideration was routed within the group. No known, or related counter-party. No known, or related counter-party.
Commercial narrative Not accepted by the Telangana HC. Accepted by the Telangana HC.  Regular trader with an established portfolio. Accepted by the Telangana HC.  One-time surplus; documented advisory process and asset allocation.  Further, part of the holding retained.
Loss and gain set off Short-term capital loss of approximately INR 462,00,00,000 against long-term capital gains on sale of securities. Short-term capital loss of approximately INR 17,65,00,000 against long-term capital gains on the sale of securities. Short-term capital gains of approximately INR 49,33,00,000 against long-term capital gains on a slump sale under Section 50B of the Act.
Burden of proof Placed on the taxpayer under Section 96(2) of the Act. Income Tax Department must produce material establishing an impermissible avoidance arrangement. Income Tax Department must produce material establishing each ingredient of Sections 96(1) and 102(1) of the Act.
Outcome Writ dismissed and GAAR proceedings to continue GAAR AP directions set aside. GAAR AP directions set aside.

 

Some critical observations from the above are summarised below.

First, the decisive distinction is whether the Income Tax Department can establish a prearranged arrangement involving concert, control, circularity or an absence of commercial substance.  In Ayodhya Rami Reddy Alla (Supra), the private placement, timing of the bonus issue, related-party sale and funding arrangements formed part of an interconnected chain of transactions, substantially within the group’s control.  The resulting loss was, hence, not an independent consequence of market transactions.  By contrast, in Smt. Anvida Bandi (Supra) and EKGE Retail (Supra), the purchases and sales were undertaken through recognised stock exchanges, at prevailing market prices, with no evidence of prearrangement or control over the counterparties.  The resulting capital gains or losses were dependent on market movements, rather than a predetermined arrangement to manufacture losses.  The distinction, consequently, is between a contrived arrangement to generate a tax benefit and a genuine commercial transaction, which happens to produce a tax benefit.

Second, the decisions are not readily reconcilable on the burden of proof.  Ayodhya Rami Reddy Alla (Supra) placed the burden on the taxpayer by reference to Section 96(2) of the Act, whereas EKGE Retail (Supra) and Smt. Anvida Bandi (Supra) placed the burden on the Income Tax Department.  In the opinion of the authors, Section 96(2) of the Act creates a presumption, which is triggered only after the Income Tax Department establishes that the main purpose of a particular step in, or part of, the arrangement was to obtain a tax benefit.  The burden then shifts to the taxpayer to rebut the presumption concerning the main purpose of the arrangement as a whole.  It does not, however, dispense with the Income Tax Department’s obligation to establish both the existence of an arrangement and at least 1 of the additional conditions prescribed under Section 96(1)(a) to (d) of the Act.  The precise scope and sequencing of these evidentiary burdens would benefit from authoritative judicial clarification.

Third, the reasoning in EKGE Retail (Supra) rests squarely on the text and scheme of Sections 96 and 102 of the Act. Hence, it has a more direct statutory foundation, making its reasoning potentially applicable beyond Bonus Stripping and stock-exchange transactions.  While the said judgment does not expressly reconcile the earlier authorities, its emphasis on the Income Tax Department establishing each of the statutory ingredients of an impermissible avoidance arrangement, provides a particularly useful framework for testing the invocation of GAAR.  In that sense, EKGE Retail (Supra) may prove to be the more durable authority on the statutory requirements for invoking GAAR.

Key Takeaways for General Applicability:

Ingredients of GAAR Should be Strictly Construed and Established before it can be Invoked:

The insistence in EKGE Retail (Supra) on strict construction of Chapter X-A of the Act and on the Income Tax Department establishing the statutory ingredients of an impermissible avoidance arrangement is well founded.  Chapter X-A of the Act confers wide powers on the Income Tax Department to disregard, combine or recharacterise transactions and to consequently, reallocate income under Section 98 of the Act.  The said powers can materially alter the legal and tax consequences of transactions otherwise undertaken by the taxpayer. They must, therefore, be exercised strictly within the limits prescribed by the statute.  A legal fiction must be confined to the purpose for which it is created and cannot be extended beyond its statutory object.[8]

The burden of establishing that the apparent is not the real ordinarily rests on the party making that allegation.[9]  In this regard, the Supreme Court has emphasised that the Income Tax Department must identify the transaction or scheme and examine its true nature and dominant purpose, rather than begin with the assumption that a transaction is designed to avoid tax.[10]  The elaborate safeguards under Section 144BA of the Act, including consideration by the Principal Commissioner and the Approving Panel, further reinforce that GAAR is an extraordinary statutory mechanism, which cannot be invoked on suspicion or merely because a transaction results in a tax advantage.[11]

The approach is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. vs. Canada[12], which places the burden of establishing abusive tax avoidance on the revenue authorities.  Where the existence of abuse remains unclear, the benefit of the doubt goes to the taxpayer, though this allocation of the burden is specific to the abuse inquiry under the Canadian GAAR.

Strict construction does not, however, mean that GAAR can be invoked only where direct evidence of tax avoidance is available.  Purpose may be established through the surrounding circumstances and the cumulative effect of the transactions, applying the standard of preponderance of probabilities.  Further, Section 96(2) of the Act expressly provides for a presumption regarding the main purpose of an arrangement where the main purpose of a step in, or a part of, that arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit.  The Income Tax Department must nevertheless establish the factual foundation for invoking that presumption, and the presumption does not dispense with the requirement of establishing at least 1 of the additional conditions under Section 96(1)(a) to (d) of the Act. The distinction is between drawing legitimate inferences from the evidence and treating the existence of a tax benefit as conclusive evidence of an impermissible arrangement.

GAAR Does Not Displace the Taxpayer’s Right to Choose a Tax-Efficient Course of Action:

The principle laid down in IRC vs. Duke of Westminster[13], that every person is entitled to arrange their affairs so as to attract the least amount of tax, continues to form part of Indian tax jurisprudence.  Although McDowell & Company Limited vs. The Commercial Tax Officer[14] cautioned against colourable devices and artificial tax avoidance, UOI vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan[15] and Vodafone International Holdings BV (Supra)[16], reaffirmed that legitimate tax planning cannot be equated with tax evasion or impermissible avoidance.[17]

The principle is also reflected in CIT vs. Walfort Share & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd.[18], where the Supreme Court allowed the claim arising from Dividend Stripping undertaken before the introduction of the SAAR under Section 94(7) of the Act.  It observed that tax planning, in the absence of colourable devices, cannot by itself be regarded as objectionable.  The broader proposition is that a taxpayer is not required to conduct transactions in the manner which maximises the Income Tax Department’s tax collection, provided the chosen course is permissible under the law.

GAAR qualifies this principle, but does not extinguish it.  A taxpayer’s freedom to choose a tax-efficient method of carrying out a genuine transaction remains intact unless the arrangement independently satisfies the statutory requirements of an impermissible avoidance arrangement.  A transaction does not become impermissible merely because another commercially available method would have resulted in a higher tax liability.  As reinforced in EKGE Retail (Supra), applying the computation and set-off provisions of the Act according to their terms cannot, without more, amount to misuse or abuse of the Act.

The CBDT has similarly clarified that GAAR shall not interfere with the taxpayer’s right to select the method of implementing a transaction.[19]  The Canadian Supreme Court has adopted a comparable approach – the abuse inquiry must be anchored in the object, spirit and purpose of the specific provisions relied upon to obtain the tax benefit, rather than in a general policy against tax reduction.[20]

The Legislative history of Section 94(8) of the Act provides a useful illustration.  Before its extension to securities, including shares, with effect from AY 2023-24, the provision specifically addressed Bonus Stripping in units of mutual funds.  The fact that a transaction involving listed shares fell outside the provision during the earlier period did not, by itself, make the resulting loss impermissible.  Equally, the subsequent extension of Section 94(8) of the Act does not retrospectively determine the character of earlier transactions.  Although Ayodhya Rami Reddy Alla (Supra) establishes that the existence of SAAR does not automatically exclude the application of GAAR, the latter can be invoked only where its independent statutory requirements are satisfied.  The mere fact that a transaction falls outside the scope of a SAAR cannot, by itself, establish an impermissible avoidance arrangement.

The Main Purpose Must Be Established from the Evidence, Not Merely from the Tax Benefit:

The existence of a tax benefit is only the starting point of the GAAR inquiry; it cannot, by itself, establish that obtaining such benefit was the main purpose of the arrangement. The Income Tax Department must examine the surrounding circumstances, the commercial context and the manner in which the transaction was actually undertaken before arriving at a finding regarding its dominant purpose.

The Legislative history of Section 96 of the Act reinforces this distinction.  The original formulation of Section 96(1) of the Act, as introduced in 2012, referred to arrangements having “the main purpose or one of the main purposes” of obtaining a tax benefit.  Following the Shome Committee’s recommendations, the Finance Act, 2013 narrowed the test to “the main purpose”.  This deliberate change is significant: the existence of a tax advantage as one among several purposes is insufficient; obtaining that advantage must be the dominant purpose of the arrangement.

This approach is consistent with Vodafone International Holdings BV (Supra), where the Supreme Court cautioned against beginning the inquiry with the question whether a transaction is a tax-saving device.  It also accords with IRC vs. Brebner[21], where the House of Lords recognised that choosing the less heavily taxed of two available methods of carrying out a genuine commercial transaction does not, by itself, make tax avoidance one of its main objects.

Smt. Anvida Bandi (Supra) and EKGE Retail (Supra) apply this principle in the context of transactions in listed shares.  The fact that a taxpayer purchases shares before a bonus issue and sells them thereafter, thereby generating a short-term capital loss, does not automatically establish that the main purpose of the transaction was to obtain a tax benefit.  The timing of the transaction must be examined alongside the surrounding commercial circumstances and the extent to which the taxpayer exercised control over the outcome.

The practical implication is that contemporaneous evidence assumes considerable importance.  Investment proposals, internal allocation decisions, investment committee records, advice received at the time of investment and evidence of the commercial rationale can help establish the purpose for which the transactions were undertaken.  Equally, the absence of prearrangement, the exposure to market risk and the uncertainty of the eventual gain or loss may support the taxpayer’s case.

Not every circumstance, however, carries equal evidentiary weight.  In particular, retaining the bonus shares after selling the original shares is inherent in the mechanics of Bonus Stripping, since the investor ordinarily retains the bonus shares whose cost of acquisition is reduced to NIL or apportioned in accordance with the applicable provisions.  That circumstance, in isolation, is not necessarily evidence of a tax-driven arrangement. In EKGE Retail (Supra), the more persuasive indicators were the documented investment allocation process, the manner in which the investments were made and the market risk borne by the taxpayer.  The inquiry must, hence, focus on the totality of the evidence, rather than on individual features viewed in isolation.

An “Arrangement” Requires More Than the Mere Existence of a Tax-Advantaged Transaction:

One of the most significant, and potentially contestable, aspects of EKGE Retail (Supra) is its interpretation of the expression “arrangement” under Section 102(1) of the Act.  The Telangana HC implicitly relied on the principle of noscitur a sociis[22] to interpret the expressions “transaction“, “operation“, “scheme“, “agreement” and “understanding” in their statutory context.  It held that these expressions, read together, contemplate a degree of concert, design or arrangement between identifiable parties or, at the very least, a preordained series of steps whose outcome is within the control of the person alleged to have entered into the arrangement.

This reasoning bears some resemblance to the approach adopted under W.T. Ramsay Ltd vs. Inland Revenue Commissioners[23] and its line of cases in the United Kingdom, where interconnected steps may be examined as a composite transaction when they form part of a preordained series of events and the subsequent steps are not realistically independent of the first.[24]  The underlying principle is that the Income Tax Department must identify an arrangement or a coherent series of steps, rather than artificially aggregate independent transactions merely because their combined tax effect is favourable.

Significantly, however, there is an important distinction between the Indian statutory definition and the position under Australian law.  Section 177A of Australia’s Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936 expressly defines a “scheme” to include a course of action and clarifies that a scheme may be unilateral.  Section 102(1) of the Act does not contain an equivalent express clarification.  This distinction lends some support to the interpretation adopted in EKGE Retail (Supra), although the breadth of the Indian definition, which extends to any agreement, arrangement, understanding, scheme, transaction or part thereof, leaves room for a wider interpretation.

The Income Tax Department may accordingly contend that the relevant arrangement need not necessarily involve an agreement with an identifiable counterparty.  It may argue that the taxpayer’s own investment strategy, comprising the purchase of shares before a bonus issue and their subsequent sale, constitutes an arrangement within the meaning of Section 102(1) of the Act.  Whether such a strategy amounts to an arrangement must, therefore, depend on its factual characteristics and the degree of preordination or control involved.

The distinction is particularly important in the case of transactions executed on recognised stock exchanges.  The fact that a transaction is executed through an exchange does not, by itself, exclude the possibility of concert or prearrangement.  Synchronized or coordinated trades between identifiable parties may still form part of a larger arrangement.[25]  Conversely, where a taxpayer transacts through the ordinary market mechanism, cannot identify or influence the counterparty and has no control over the market price or eventual outcome, it may become difficult to characterise the trade as a prearranged scheme or operation.

The principle emerging from EKGE Retail (Supra) should, therefore, be stated with appropriate qualification: an independent market transaction, whose counterparty and outcome are beyond the taxpayer’s control, cannot be converted into an “arrangement” merely because it produces a tax benefit.  However, the use of a recognised stock exchange cannot provide a safe harbour where the Income Tax Department establishes that the trades formed part of a coordinated or prearranged scheme.

The Tax Outcome Must Be Distinguished from the Commercial Substance of the Transaction:

A further takeaway from EKGE Retail (Supra) is that the commercial substance of a transaction must be evaluated independently of its tax consequences.  A transaction does not lack commercial substance merely because it results in a tax loss, nor does the absence of an immediate commercial gain necessarily make it artificial.

Section 97 of the Act identifies circumstances in which an arrangement may be regarded as lacking commercial substance, including situations involving round-trip financing, accommodating parties, elements that offset or cancel each other, or transactions having no significant effect on the business risks or net cash flows of the parties.  These indicators must be examined in the context of the arrangement as a whole.

The contrast between Ayodhya Rami Reddy Alla (Supra) and EKGE Retail (Supra) is instructive.  In the former, the connected-party transactions, funding arrangements and subsequent movement of funds provided material from which the Income Tax Department could infer that the transactions were part of a prearranged exercise.  In the latter, the investments involved genuine market exposure, independent counterparties and uncertain outcomes.  The fact that the taxpayer ultimately realised a loss did not establish that the transactions lacked commercial substance.

The relevant question is not whether the transaction produced the intended tax result, but whether it involved genuine economic exposure and commercial decision-making or was merely a contrived series of steps designed to produce a predetermined tax consequence.  This distinction is central to ensuring that GAAR remains an anti-abuse provision and does not become a general power to disregard transactions simply because they are tax-efficient.

GAAR is an Anti-Abuse Rule, not an Anti-Tax-Benefit Rule:

This is a common thread running through all 5 takeaways.  The Act does not prohibit taxpayers from obtaining tax benefits through legitimate transactions.  It prohibits arrangements which obtain those benefits through the specific forms of abuse identified in Section 96 of the Act.  This distinction also provides the best way to reconcile Ayodhya Rami Reddy Alla (Supra) with Smt. Anvida Bandi (Supra) and EKGE Retail (Supra): the former involved evidence of an artificial, interconnected arrangement, whereas the latter decisions involved transactions for which the Income Tax Department could not establish the requisite elements of impermissible avoidance.

Conclusion:

What follows is that GAAR is an instance of the Government’s continuing concerted attack on aggressive and abusive tax avoidance schemes.  Indeed, it is dramatic, being in the nature of “cover all types of remedy”.  Further, it is draconian, inasmuch as a Commissioner can do pretty much what s/he wants to do in order to bring to tax a transaction.  It is, hence, significant that Courts keep re-emphasizing how GAAR should be applied – i.e., with circumscription, in order to remedy tax avoidance and protect fiscus, and not as a mere penal or revenue raising measure, beyond the authority of the law.  Subjecting taxpayers to GAAR proceedings when the basic elements required to invoke GAAR are not demonstrable by evidence, would run afoul of Article 265 of the Constitution of India.  The main takeaway from the judgments discussed hereinabove is, if you intend to achieve a commercial outcome, you can arrange such outcome in the most efficient way, so long as the driver of the identified outcome is not inherently illicit.  The decisions represent a positive development in the GAAR jurisprudence, providing useful insights into the judicial approach, both to the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions.

[1]           The deferral can, however, translate into a permanent tax saving where the subsequent capital gain is taxable at a lower rate than the gain against which the original loss was set off.  This may arise, for instance, where the bonus shares are held for more than 12 months and their subsequent sale qualifies as a long-term capital gain taxable under Section 112A of the Act, thereby attracting the concessional rate of taxation applicable to such gains.

[2]           The Memorandum to the Finance Bill, 2022 expressly acknowledges that Section 94(8) of the Act, as it then stood, did not apply to Bonus Stripping in securities and identifies the extension as a measure to curb its misuse.

[3]           The corresponding provision in the Income-tax Act, 2025 is Section 175.  However, the Bonus Stripping rule is now contained in subsections (9) and (10), rather than subsection (8).

[4]           [2024] 163 taxmann.com 277 (Telangana HC).

[5]           [2025] 177 taxmann.com 726 (Telangana HC).

[6]           W.P. No. 21210 of 2022, decided on October 13, 2026 (Telangana HC).

[7]               MRL was later amalgamated into EKGE Retail Pvt. Ltd., whose successor is EKGE Retail LLP.

[8]           CIT vs. Mother India Refrigeration Industries (P) Ltd., [1985] 2 SCC 610 (Supreme Court).

[9]           CIT vs. Daulat Ram Rawatmull, [1973] 3 SCC 528 (Supreme Court).

[10]          Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. UOI, [2012] 6 SCC 613 (Supreme Court), per S.H. Kapadia, C.J.

[11]          Section 144BA of the Act and Rules 10UA to 10UC of the Income-tax Rules, 1962; Circular No. 7 of 2017 dated 27 January, 2017, issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (“CBDT”), Answer to Question 10.

[12]          [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601.

[13]          [1936] AC 1, per Lord Tomlin.

[14]          1985 (3) SCC 230 (Supreme Court).

[15]          [2004] 10 SCC 1 (Supreme Court).

[16]          [2012] 6 SCC 613 (Supreme Court).

[17]          See also: CIT vs. A. Raman & Co., AIR 1968 SC 49 (Supreme Court).

[18]          [2010] 8 SCC 137 (Supreme Court).

[19]          Circular No. 7 of 2017 dated 27.01.2017 issued by the CBDT, Answer to Question 3.

[20]          Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. (Supra); and Copthorne Holdings Ltd. vs. Canada, 2011 SCC 63.

[21]          [1967] 2 AC 18 (HL), per Lord Upjohn.

[22]          See also, State of Bombay vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 (Supreme Court).

[23]          [1982] A.C. 300.

[24]          Craven vs. White, [1989] AC 398 (House of Lords); and Furniss vs. Dawson, [1984] AC 474 (House of Lords).

[25]          SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd., [2018] 13 SCC 753 (Supreme Court).

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