Case No. 30 of 2025, XYZ v. Jindal Stainless Limited and Ors.

Background

The CCI dismissed a complaint alleging that Jindal Stainless Limited (‘JSL’) had contravened Sections 3(4) and 4 of the Act through its exclusive supply arrangements for stainless steel slabs (‘SS Slabs’) and hot rolled coils (‘SS HRC’) with Indonesian entities affiliated with the Eternal Tsingshan Group (‘ET Group’), and through its Jindal Saathi dealer programme.

The informant alleged that JSL’s joint venture with the ET Group, which includes an exclusive off-take arrangement for the output of a 1.2 million tonne capacity melt shop facility in Indonesia, constituted exclusive dealing and refusal to deal arrangements that foreclosed access to critical upstream inputs for competing cold rolled stainless steel (‘CRSS’) manufacturers. The stainless steel production process follows a sequential value chain wherein SS Slabs are hot-rolled into SS HRC, which is then cold-rolled to produce CRSS, the finished flat product used across applications such as white goods, automotive components, construction, and industrial fabrication. The informant also alleged that JSL’s Jindal Saathi programme operating through MoUs with volume-based incentives created de facto exclusivity and lock-in at the downstream level.

CCI Findings

The CCI observed that the allegations of exclusive dealing and refusal to deal between JSL and the Indonesian entities were premised on the assertion that competing manufacturers had been denied access to nickel-rich SS Slabs and SS HRC. However, the informant furnished no direct evidence demonstrating that it, or any other manufacturer, had actually sought procurement from these suppliers and was refused supply; the allegations rested largely on circumstantial indicators like import patterns and strategic investments. The CCI noted that multiple domestic and international sources of inputs remained available, such as Rimjhim Stainless and Viraj Profiles import independently from Indonesia; SS HRC is imported from Sweden, South Korea and other countries through BIS-certified suppliers; and JSL supplies Indonesian billets to domestic manufacturers like Mukand, Ambica Steel and others. Further, the domestic suppliers (i.e., Salem Steel Plant, BRG Iron & Steel) and independent re-rollers (i.e., Suncity Metals & Tubes, Hisar Metal Industries and others) also actively procure inputs globally and locally. Further, no existing manufacturer had exited the market, and no specific instance of denial of supply was identified. The joint venture of JSL and ET Group was found to be an integration initiative that did not prima facie disclose any competition concern.

The CCI delineated 2 relevant markets, namely: (i) the upstream market as ‘market for the supply of SS Slabs and SS HRC used in the manufacture of CRSS in India’; and (ii) the downstream market as ‘market for CRSS in India’. In the upstream market, the CCI found that JSL does not appear to hold a dominant position, noting the presence of multiple domestic and international suppliers including several BIS-certified overseas manufacturers, and the absence of any prima facie demonstration that competing manufacturers are dependent upon JSL for access to such inputs. However, in the downstream market for CRSS in India, the CCI found that JSL prima facie occupied a dominant position, having regard to its considerable economic resources, assets, revenues, production capacity, continued expansion through acquisitions and backward integration, and significant presence particularly in the wide CRSS segment.

While the CCI found that JSL prima facie occupied a dominant position in the downstream market for CRSS in India, it held that the allegation of input foreclosure under Section 4(2)(c) was not substantiated. No evidence was adduced showing that any competing manufacturer suffered production constraints, reduced output, or market exit attributable to restricted access to inputs. The record instead indicated the presence of several domestic manufacturers, independent re-rollers, MSME manufacturers, and numerous BIS-certified international suppliers from whom inputs could be sourced.

Lastly, the CCI observed that the Jindal Saathi programme and associated MoUs were voluntary, non-binding, incentive-based arrangements that did not impose any minimum purchase obligation, exclusivity requirement, or penalty for sourcing from competitors. Participation was not a precondition for purchasing material from JSL, the MoU terms permitted procurement from other suppliers, and a substantial number of pipe and tube manufacturers operated outside the programme. In the absence of evidence demonstrating customer lock-in, denial of market access, loss of customers, or foreclosure of competitors, the CCI found no material to conclude that the arrangements amounted to abuse of dominance.