Presumption of Bribery Under the PC Act

Section 20 of the PC Act establishes a statutory presumption for cases involving bribery, providing that, if a public servant is found to have accepted any gratification other than legal remuneration, it is presumed that the gratification was accepted to influence the public servant’s official act or to forbear from performing their official duty.

Such a presumption is vital for the prosecution of corruption cases, especially when direct evidence of bribery is circumstantial and, in most cases, difficult to obtain. However, this presumption is not automatic; it requires the establishment of certain foundational facts, including proof of demand and acceptance of the bribe.

The provision empowers the court to presume that a public servant’s acceptance of any undue advantage is tied to an act of corruption, unless the contrary is proved. However, this presumption operates only after the prosecution establishes the necessary facts – ie, the demand for a bribe by the accused and the acceptance of that bribe. Without proving the applicability of these factors, the presumption of an offence under Section 20 of the PC Act cannot be invoked.

The Supreme Court has been clear that, while Section 20 of the PC Act provides a strong tool in prosecuting corruption, it must not be misused. The law demands that the foundational facts must be proven first, and that a mere recovery of tainted money, or possession of a bribe, does not automatically lead to a presumption of corruption by the accused.

In State of Lokayuktha Police v CB Nagaraj, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1175, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of an accused on the ground that there was no factum of demand. The Supreme Court further emphasised that an entire chain – beginning with demand, then acceptance and finally recovery – must be completed, and that such a presumption cannot cast an unwarranted onus on the accused. The Court rebutted the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act by pointing out the contradictions in the complainant’s testimony, which raised doubts over the existence of a demand for the bribe. Without proof of demand, the presumption under Section 20 could not be applied.

Similarly, in Dileepbhai Nanubhai Sanghani v the State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 441, the Supreme Court emphasised that mere procedural irregularities, such as bypassing the tender process in allotment of a contract, do not automatically amount to corruption under the PC Act. The Court held that for a charge of corruption to be sustained there must be credible evidence of demand or acceptance of illegal gratification. The Court noted that the investigation report did not find any material linking the appellant to corrupt practices. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Gujarat High Court should have allowed the appellant’s discharge application, as the investigation report did not adequately consider the pre-charge evidence.

The Supreme Court has time and again clearly set out the threshold for the invocation of the presumption against the accused under Section 20 of the PC Act, by applying a strict standard and reaffirming that the evidence must be thoroughly examined by the courts to determine the demand and acceptance of the bribe by the public official.

Abetment of Offences Under the PC Act

The PC Act was introduced to curb bribery and corruption practices among “public servants”, who are defined under Section 2(c) of the PC Act. However, the PC Act can also be extended to persons falling outside the definition of a “public servant”, through Section 12 of the PC Act.

The provisions categorically provide for a punishment for the act of inducing or attempting to induce a public servant to accept an illegal gratification. Further, Section 13(1) read with Section 13(2) penalises public servants who, by corrupt or illegal means, obtain any pecuniary advantage. These provisions ensure that both the giver and the receiver of bribes are held accountable.

The PC Act, through its provision for abetment, enlarges the scope of applicability of the penal provisions by including individuals who abet any offence under the PC Act. The PC Act recognises that corruption is a collective offence, involving both public servants and private individuals. Therefore, individuals who abet or conspire with public servants to commit corruption-related offences are made culpable through Section 12 of the PC Act.

In P Shanthi Pugazhenthi v the State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1091 (P Shanti), the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the wife of a public servant, arising out of an order of the Madras High Court – the appellant therein was charged under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, for abetment of her husband in acquiring disproportionate assets, which were purchased in her name.

The Supreme Court in P Shanti clarified that private individuals who induce or assist public servants in committing corruption-related offences are liable under Section 12 of the PC Act. Further, the Supreme Court noted that the appellant therein was the wife of the “public servant” at the time of commission of the crime, and assisted the “public servant” in accumulation of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income. This ruling expanded the scope of accountability, ensuring that both parties involved in corrupt transactions are prosecuted.

It is settled that any person who persuades a public servant to take bribes, decides to raise money through bribes along with a public servant, and prompts such public servant to keep the wealth with them or keeps the amassed wealth of a public servant in their own name is guilty of committing the offence of abetment of an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.

Further, originally the PC Act only provided for abetment of an offence being punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 of the PC Act. Pursuant to the 2018 Amendment to the PC Act, the scope of Section 12 has been expanded to now cover abetment of any offence under the PC Act.

In P Nallammal v the State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1040 (P Nallammal), the Supreme Court gave a split verdict on the culpability of P Nallammal, the wife of a former minister in the state government of Tamil Nadu, for her alleged role in abetting her husband in acquiring disproportionate assets in her name, while he was holding public office as a public servant.

The division bench of the Supreme Court in P Nallammal gave a split verdict on the point of whether mere registration of the disproportionate assets of the “public servant” in the wife’s name makes the wife liable for abetment under Section 12 of the PC Act. One judge upheld the appellant’s conviction, since the appellant had assets registered in her name and was unable to establish her independent source of income, whereas the other judge set aside the conviction on the lack of mens rea on the part of the appellant. The bench has referred the matter for constitution of a larger bench, and the issue is still pending.

It is worth highlighting that the Supreme Court in P Shanti noted that the accused/appellant therein assisted the “public servant” in accumulation of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income, and thus upheld the conviction of the appellant/ accused.

Preliminary Inquiry Not Mandatory Prior to Registration of a First Information Report (FIR)

Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), similar to the corresponding provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), empowers the police to register an FIR upon receiving information about the commission of a cognisable offence.

Under the CrPC regime, the Supreme Court, in light of the lacunae in the law and by way of judge-made law, has enabled a police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry (in certain categories of cases) to ascertain whether a cognisable offence was disclosed in the complaint. However, under the BNSS, the legislature has given a statutory recognition to the concept of preliminary inquiry in cases punishable with imprisonment for three years or more but less than seven years, wherein the police officer may conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within a period of 14 days.

While a preliminary inquiry may be conducted in some cases to assess the credibility of the information, it is not mandatory before an FIR is registered, and this is within the discretion of the police officer. This aligns with the objective of ensuring that corruption-related cases are investigated promptly and thoroughly, without unnecessary delays.

The courts in India have held that, while a preliminary inquiry may help to determine whether the information reveals the commission of a cognisable offence, it is not a prerequisite for an FIR under the PC Act.

In State of Karnataka v TN Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 SCC Online SC 382, the Supreme Court clarified that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory before registering an FIR under the PCA. The Court observed that the purpose of such an inquiry is not to verify the accuracy of the information but simply to ascertain whether it reveals a cognisable offence. Thus, the Court concluded that a preliminary inquiry cannot be used as a tool to delay the registration of an FIR or to give the accused an undue advantage.

The Supreme Court noted that a preliminary inquiry is not sine qua non for registering a case against a public servant who is accused of corruption, and that it is neither a vested right of the accused nor a mandatory prerequisite for registration of a criminal case. The Court noted that the purpose of a preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity of the information received, but merely to ascertain whether said information reveals the commission of a cognisable offence. Notably, the Court emphasised that whether a preliminary inquiry is necessary or not will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case.

In State of Karnataka v Channakeshava HD, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 753, the Court further reinforced this view, noting that the law does not grant the accused a vested right to insist on a preliminary inquiry before an FIR is registered. The Court emphasised that the need for a preliminary inquiry should be assessed based on the facts of each case but should not be an impediment to the registration of an FIR in cases of corruption.

While a preliminary inquiry is not mandated, the PC Act provides for prior approval of the competent authority before enquiring into or investigating alleged offences by public servants in the discharge of their official functions or duties. Section 17A of the PC Act, which came into effect on 26 July 2018, aims to protect honest public servants from harassment during inquiries in respect of the decisions taken or acts done in the bona fide performance of their official functions or duties. Section 17A of the PC Act provides that an investigation into offences under the Act can begin only after the approval of a competent authority. The remit of the competent authority in this regard is only limited to whether the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of their official functions or duties.

Therefore, a fully fledged inquiry is not required before registering an FIR; however, if the offence is relatable to the discharge of official functions, a sanction would be necessary before conducting a preliminary inquiry and then registering an FIR.

Prior Sanction Under Section 19 of the PC Act

Section 19 of the PC Act mandates that no court shall take cognisance of an offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under Sections 7, 11, 13 or 15 of the PC Act, except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. This provision aims to protect public servants from frivolous or politically motivated prosecutions, ensuring that only competent authorities can grant permission to prosecute.

The requirement of prior sanction is a safeguard to prevent the misuse of legal provisions against harassment of public servants. However, in recent times the courts have clarified on multiple occasions that mere irregularities in the granting of sanction do not automatically vitiate the trial. The prosecution must demonstrate that such irregularities have resulted in a failure of justice and caused grave prejudice to the accused.

In Luckose Joseph v State of Kerala, 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 5986, the Kerala High Court observed that, while a valid sanction is a prerequisite for prosecuting public servants under the PC Act, mere error or irregularities in the sanction order will not alter or reverse any finding, sentence or order of a court unless it causes a failure of justice. This judgment underscores the principle that procedural defects must be substantial enough to affect the fairness of the trial.

Similarly, in State of Punjab v Hari Kesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 49, the Supreme Court held that irregularity or error in the granting of sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act is not a ground for quashing the trial unless it results in a failure of justice, especially in a case where trial has already commenced. The Supreme Court emphasised that the validity of a sanction order should be tested during the course of the trial, as the trial court has to appreciate the evidence on the aspect of whether the irregularity of sanction caused a failure of justice.

Applicability of the PC Act – Definition of “Public Servants”

Section 2(c) of the PCA defines a “public servant” to include:

• individuals in the service or pay of the government;
• persons remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty;
• officers or employees of corporations owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the government; and
• individuals holding positions by virtue of which they are authorised or required to perform any public duty.

This broad definition ensures that various categories of individuals, beyond regular government employees, are encompassed under the PCA’s ambit. The expansive definition of “public servant” under the PC Act has been pivotal in prosecuting individuals who, despite not being traditional government employees, perform public duties or hold positions of trust. This includes private individuals and employees of private entities who, by virtue of their roles related to public duty, are deemed to be public servants.

In Aman Bhatia v the State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013, the Supreme Court ruled that licensed stamp vendors are public servants under the PC Act. The Court reasoned that these vendors, by performing a public duty and receiving government remuneration, fall within the definition of public servants. This judgment extended the scope of the PC Act to include individuals in public-facing roles, reinforcing the Act’s objective of comprehensively combating corruption.

Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v Sanjay S/O, 2025 BHC-NAG 7223, the Court clarified that individuals holding positions by virtue of which they are authorised or required to perform any public duty are considered public servants under the PC Act. The case involved a dismissed Vidhan Bhavan cashier who was found guilty of possessing disproportionate assets, highlighting the inclusive nature of the PC Act’s definition of public servant.

In Anil Kumar Ojha v the State, 2025 SCC OnLine Mad 4236, the Madras High Court – in line with the earlier decision of the Jharkhand High Court in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v CBI, 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar 394 (Sanjay Kumar Agarwal) – held that a resolution professional appointed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 performs duties in connection with the administration of justice, being authorised by a Court of Justice, and is a person from whom a report is called for by a Court of Justice/a competent public authority. Therefore, the resolution professional will be a public servant as they perform a public duty. However, the Delhi High Court in Arun Mohan v CBI, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8080 disagreed with the decision of the Jharkhand High Court in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal and took a contrary view, holding that resolution professionals would not fall within the scope of the PC Act. This issue is currently pending consideration before the Supreme Court.